show that recent rice export quotas resulted in falls total rural savings as measured by the difference in total income less total production cost and consumption of rice.
Introduction
The year 2008 witnessed rapid increases in the prices of many commodities in the world, including dramatic increases in the price of rice. Rising from US$ 400 per ton in January 2008 to roughly US$ 1000 per ton in May 2008, movements in international rice prices caused considerable concern in both import and export countries. Some rice exporters, including Vietnam, placed an export ban on rice to ensure continued low domestic prices for rice and domestic food security.
As the second biggest rice exporter in the world, an increase in world rice prices is potentially beneficial to Vietnam. However, rice also plays an important role in the living standards of Vietnamese households, both as producers and consumers. Rice contributes nearly 69 percent of calorie intake in Vietnam as a whole, and 71 percent in rural areas and 61 percent in urban areas (Vu and Glewwe, 2008) . On the other hand, half of the households produce rice (Vu and Glewwe, 2008) , which makes it hard to generalize on the relative benefits of increases in the price of rice. Net producers clearly benefit, but those that mostly consume rice are worse off.
The rice export ban applied in Vietnam generated considerable debate among various stakeholders. We contribute to this debate by simulating the export ban together with three other policy scenarios in a 'bottom-up' eight-region Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE) model of Vietnam, with data from the 2005 GSO inputoutput table. We then simulate the results on individual households using the 2006 Vietnamese Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS 2006) . Our results show that although there were limited 'pro-poor' outcomes, the overall effect of the rice export quotas resulted in falls total rural savings as measured by the difference in total income less total production cost and consumption of rice.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the background and reviews existing studies in Vietnam that have tried to estimate the welfare impact of government policies in rice market. Section 3 describes the methods and data. The results from the CGE model and micro-simulation on household data are discussed in section 4. Section 5 offer concluding remarks.
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Background
Vietnam has made remarkable progress in the rice production in the last thirty years, moving from being a large importer of rice from 1976-80, to now the second largest exporter of rice in the world. About 7.5 million hectares of land is under rice cultivation, producing approximately 39 million tonnes a year. More than 50% of the rice output is produced by the Mekong River Delta and more than 90% of exported rice comes from this region. As recent as the year 2008, Vietnam rice exports reached 5 million tonnes of rice with export revenue of about 3 billion USD, contributing roughly 3 per cent to the GDP of Vietnam.
There have been many policy changes over the last thirty years in the rice sector.
Most important are the pervasive land and market reforms in agriculture, which moved the system of rice production from commune-based public ownership and control to one with effective private property rights over land and farm assets, competitive domestic markets and individual decision making over a wide range of agricultural activities ). The outstanding successes in increasing rice production aside, the Vietnamese rice market is characterized by many constraints and concerns. Paddy markets, for example, especially between the North and the South, are not fully integrated (Baulch et al, 2008) . Although the strict quota regime on rice export was removed in 2001, the government still monitors rice exports by setting the export target for each year based on the production of the previous year, with adjustment if needed during the year. There are also a number of bureaucratic procedures that export enterprises need to go through in order to export rice, such as receiving price approval from the Vietnam Food Association on export prices on all export contracts.
In the year 2008, the Vietnamese government faced a significant challenge to its practice of monitoring and controlling rice exports. With rapid increases in international rice prices from US$ 400 in January 2008 to roughly US$ 600 in March, and an overall high inflation rate in the domestic economy for food prices (18.9 percent in 2007 and 14.5 percent in the first three months of 2008), the Government of Vietnam banned the signing of new export contracts from the 25th March until the end of May 2008. In addition, in July 21, 2008, an export tax was imposed on rice sold at $800 a tonne or more. When the tax went into effect on Aug. 15, prices for Vietnamese '5% broken rice', the highest quality grain among the country's common grades for export, had fallen to $550 per tonne, free-on-board basis. The export tax was subsequently abolished on December 19, 2008 to help boost domestic supply.
A temporarily ban on rice exports versus full trade liberalization generates an essential trade-off. On one hand, liberalization leads to further increases in domestic rice prices, which result in increases in input costs for all producers since wages, especially unskilled labour and labour involved in small manufacturing, are often correlated with the price of rice. The cost of rice to consumers also increases, of course. On the other hand, increases in rice prices increase profits for net rice producers, many of whom are the poor. As seen in Figure 1 Table 1997 , and shows that an export quota has been a binding and restrictive policy that has kept both Vietnamese rice production and exports well below their maximum potential amounts. where Export is the real export volume of good C in region R; QF and PF are the quantity and price shift parameters of good C in region R; P is the export price;
EXP_ELAST(c,r) is the elasticity of export demand of good C in region R; and e is the exchange rate. For the export demand schedule to be downward slopping, EXP_ELAST(c,r) must be negative in the model. Government expenditure and composition is held fixed as is the demand for inventories. Margins (with the exception of inventory demand) are given and the usual market clearing conditions are imposed.
Micro-simulation
As the household can be a consumer or producer of rice, or both, any change in the price of rice affects not only consumption but also income and production. To measure the impact of various policy scenarios, we use a metric of 'rice household savings' from rice production as an indicator of the household welfare, given by the difference between revenue and the cost of rice production, less the consumption of rice. All terms are in values. Household savings before the price shock is used as the benchmark and compared across all policy scenarios modelled in the CGE framework. The household is considered to be 'better off' if it has more savings after a resulting price shock.
Data
This paper uses the 8-region Inter-regional Input Output Tables. There is thus strong comparability between the macro and micro data. This paper relies on income and expenditure data of these 9,189 households as the income data of the remaining households is not yet released to public. In this report, we use the term '2006 VHLSS' to refer to the sample of 9,189 households.
Policy scenario design
The key exogenous shock in the model is a 30 percent increase in rice export prices as the result of an upward shift of the world demand schedule for rice. This roughly corresponds to the movement in world rice prices. 
Results and discussion
Model results
At the national level, the increase in international rice price does not have a large impact on GDP in the Vietnamese economy (see Table 1 ), with the change in GDP ranging from a reduction of 0.37 percent under the scenario of export limits and producer tax to an increase of 0.6 percent under the scenario of export limits alone.
The free trade scenario results in a marginal reduction of 0.06 percent of GDP while the tariff leads to as small 0.01 percent increase in GDP. Despite the fact that the economy gains from higher price on its rice export, the surge in the domestic price of rice has the effect of increasing the domestic cost of production, since wages (correlated with the price of rice) also increase. Table 2 , the domestic price of rice rises highest in the case of free trade, followed by the case of an export tariff. The objective of controlling the domestic price by the Government of Vietnam can be best achieved in the case of export limit. However, as the domestic market is likely fragmented (see Baulch et al., 2007) , the scenario of export limit and producer tax is more likely to occur. The gain in regional GDP from the international rice price surge does not spread evenly across the regions (see Table 3 ). The Mekong River Delta ranks the first in benefiting from the rice price rise with its GDP increasing most, or shrinking least in all scenarios. Despite being the country's second largest rice producer, the South East region does not have a comparative advantage in rice production, and higher rice prices do not affect this region greatly. Among the policy scenarios, an export tariff appears to be the least distorting with regional GDP growth moving in line with the case of free trade. The export limit and producer tax hurts all regions while the export limit narrows the regional gap in GDP growth, harming mostly the Mekong River Delta and favouring the North West, Central Highlands and South East regions. The sub-national distribution pattern can be explained by two main regional features.
First, is the share of paddy and processed rice in regional GDP. As seen in Figure 2, all regions except the Northwest and Central Highlands 'export' rice, with the Mekong Delta by far the largest international exporter. While the Red River Delta and the North Central Coast regions also substantially benefit from the rice price increase, the South East region is worse off as its paddy and processed rice share in its GDP is the lowest among all regions.
Second, the industrial employment structure also matters (see tables 4a and 4b).
Because the wage rate in the model is indexed with the consumer price index, the nominal wage increases in all regions with an increase in the price of rice. Therefore, industries with higher output prices such as Paddy, Processed Rice, or Live Poultry can increase labour employment and hence achieve higher output. On the other hand, regions with a lower share of those industries will have lower average labour employment. Despite the gain in output price, rural households suffer more than urban households in terms of consumer price changes in all scenarios except the second, where the domestic price of rice does not move with international prices (see Table 5 ).
Furthermore, in all cases, when the domestic price of rice is higher, the North West regional households have to buy a more expensive consumption bundle (with higher rice prices) than other regions. This is because North West is a remote region. Higher margin costs (trade and transportation) are thus applied to consumption goods in the region. Compared with the growth in GDP, in Table 5 , we can see that households, in particular rural households, suffer in all cases except when government intervention can prevent the domestic price of rice from increasing in line with international prices. 
Micro-simulation results:
For the micro-simulation results, household savings under the four policy scenarios are compared with the benchmark, which is household savings before the shock. This is a short run analysis, where it is assumed that there is no change in both supply and demand due to price changes. the gain from the increase in rice prices is uniform under the free trade and export tariff scenario. The export limit appears to be the most 'pro-poor' scenario with more poor than rich people benefitting from the gain. In contrast, the pro-rich pattern is shown under the export limit with producer tax. This also appears to be the worst policy choice as the fewest people can enjoy gains. On the lower panel, rural dwellers are seen better off compared to their urban counterparts in all cases except for the export limit with a producer tax.
Looking at the magnitude of the change in the household yearly savings per capita compared with the benchmark household yearly saving per capita before the shock, the urban dwellers in general also suffer much more than their counterparts in the rural areas under all scenarios. This is expected as most of them are net rice buyers.
As seen in Figure 4 , which represents the change in household yearly per capita saving by regions for samples in the rural and urban areas, export limits with producer tax hurts all urban and rural areas. Though the export limit has positive effect on all rural and most of the urban areas, its magnitude is relatively small. Free trade is the most beneficial policy measure followed by the export tariff to the rural areas (see Figure 5 ). VND, respectively. As the soil in the Central Highlands is more suitable for planting perennial crops, including coffee, pepper, rubber, cashew, tea and cotton, the rural households are more likely net rice buyers compared to other regions in the country.
So the higher are rice prices the more disadvantaged the Central Highlands region will be.
Overall, the change in household savings in given in Table 6 , where the change in regional savings is the product of the change in rice household savings and the number of households in each region. 
Closing Remarks and Recommendations
Using 
